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Eckhardt: Eckhardt: Perpetuities Reform

PERPETUITIES REFORM BY LEGISLATION
WILLARD

L. ECKHARDT*

I. INTRODUCTION

Harvard's W. Barton Leach is largely responsible for the current trend
toward perpetuities reform by legislation. In his Perpetuitiesin. a Nnttshell
he explained the Rule Against Perpetuities so lucidly that any lawyer could
understand the basic applications of the rule, and he gave colorful and
memorable names to the more absurd applications of the rule. 2 Once the
absurdities were clearly in view, reform was almost inevitable. In addition
to perpetuities problems haunting other common law states, Missouri had
its own local perpetuities problem, the doctrine of Lockridge v. Mace, infectious invalidity in its most extreme form. 8
Absent reform by the courts, there are several avenues of legislative
reform. The first attacks the problem broadside; the controversial "wait
and see" 4 approach advocated by Professor Leach and adopted by a number
of states will save most limitations, but appears to some of us to have undesirable side effects. A piecemeal approach is to deal individually with
each type of case, e.g., to reduce a stated age above twenty-one to twentyone. Another broadside approach is a general cy pres provision that permits
reformation of a limitation to bring it within the period of the rule and
*Professor of Law, University of Missouri.
1. Leach, Perpetuities in a Nutshell, 51 HARV. L. REv. 638 (1938).

2. For example, fertile octogenarian, unborn widow, precocious toddler, and
magic gravel pit. Several of these terms appeared in publications subsequent to
1938.

Missouri courts have shown a commendable willingness to avoid the absurdities by a process of free construction. For example, in an "administration
contingency" type of case where a gift was limited "to commence immediately
upon the termination of the administration of my estate," an event possibl too
remote in time, the court construed the time as "at my death": Trautz v. Lemp,
329 Mo. 580, 46 S.W.2d 135 (1932), noted in 17 ST. Louis L. REy. 370 (1932).
3. 109 Mo. 162, 18 S.W. 1145 (1891). For an extended consideration of this
doctrine and for the opinion that the case has been overruled in fact, see Eckhardt,
Ride against Perpetuitiesin Missouri, 30 Mo. L. REv. 27, 48, 61-70 (1965).
4. This approach is to wait and see what actually happens during the
perpetuities period rather than to imagine in advance what might happen during
the period. The objection to this approach is that it may leave titles unsettled
for a very long -period. In my opinion cy pres reformation is preferable.
(56)
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1966
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to approximate as nearly as possible the intention of the grantor or testator.5
II. 1965 MISSOURI REFORM LEIsLr TioN-IN GENERAL.
The first perpetuities reform bill was considered by the Missouri General Assembly in 1959, but it was not until 1965 that a bill was enacted,
now classified as section 442.555 RSMo. 6 The first subsection abolishes the
doctrine of Lockridge v. Mace (infectious invalidity in its most extreme
form), and, the principal motivation for reform legislation in Missouri was

to abolish this doctrine. The second subsection provides for cy pres reformation to salvage that part of a limitation which violates the Rule Against
Perpetuities, and in a sense is a bonus; the inflexibility of the first subsection made the second subsection highly desirable even though not ab-

solutely necessary. The third subsection is on the effective date, the problem considered below in detail. It is hoped in subsequent articles to consider the first two subsections at length.
III. EFFECTI

DAxr-IN GENERAL

The third subsection of section 442.555, on the effective date of the
act, provides as follows:
This section shall not apply to any limitation or provision as to
which the period of the rule against perpetuities has begun to run
prior to the first day of November in the year [1965] in which
this section becomes effective.

One of the first problems that will face a lawyer concerned with a perpetuities problem is whether the old law governs his case or whether the
new statute applies. It is the purpose of this article to explore that problem.
It should be noticed first that the act in effect provides specific dates,
5. For a review of recent legislation, see Leach, Perpetuities: The Nutshell
Revisited, 78 H1ALv. L. REv. 973, 987-990 (1965).
6. S.B. 318, 73d Gen. Assem. (1965).
See Eckhardt, supra note 3, at 62, n.120, for a discussion of the 1959 bill, two
1961 bills, and the 1963 and 1965 "Missouri Bar" bills. In the cited discussion I
commented on the very able contribution of Professor William F. Fratcher of the
University of Missouri School of Law as the principal draftsman of the Bar bills.
Another person deserving special credit is Charles C. Oliver, Jr., Senior Vice President & Executive Trust Officer of the Traders National Bank, Kansas City, who
was Chairman of the 1964-65 Probate and Trusts Committee of The Missouri Bar.
I was privileged to assist in the drafting and support of the bill.
Governor Warren E. Heares approved the bill on August 20, 1965, after a
long and careful study of it.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol31/iss1/11
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through October 31, 1965, and on and after November 1, 1965. This avoids
the problem, which may arise many years hence, of searching for the
exact day in October 1965 when most of the new laws became effective.
It also should be noticed that the effective date provision is in very
general terms, the key point being when the perpetuities period starts to
run, with nothing to indicate when this is. This is in contrast to very
specific provisions in earlier perpetuities bills.7 The reason for the retreat
from specifics to generalities is discussed in the last section in this article.

IV.

THE DuE PRocEss PROBLEM

Section 442.555(3) makes the new perpetuities statute prospective
only in operation. This is to avoid the problem of taking property without
due process of law. s If the act were applied retroactively there could be
a taking of property. For example, in 1960 A dvly conveys to B in fee,
and on too remote a contingency over to C in fee. The orthodox common
law analysis is that A has nothing, B has a defeasible fee which is enlarged
into a fee simple absolute because of the failure of the divesting interest,
and C has nothing, his shifting executory interest being void ab initio
because it violates the Rule Against Perpetuities. If thereafter a retroactive statute validates Cs void shifting executory interest by reforming
the period, a part of B's fee simple absolute is taken away from B and
transferred to C. In Missouri, if the doctrine of Lockridge v. Mace were
applied to the same limitation, the entire limitation would be void, A
would still have the fee simple absolute, and neither B nor C would have
any interest in the land. If thereafter a retroactive curative statute validates
B's defeasible fee by abolishing Lockridge v. Mace and validates C's shifting executory interest by reforming the period, all of A's fee simple absolute is taken away from him and transferred to B and C. In either case,
under the orthodox view or under the doctrine of Lockridge v. Mace, there
would be a taking of property without due process.
In the case of some curative statutes due process is achieved by providing a grace period of a year or two during which the owner of an interest can protect it fully either by filing for record a notice of claim or
by instituting suit; if the owner does nothing, his interest will be extinguished and there is a taking of property, but the taking is with due process.
7. S.B. 263, 72d Gen. Assem. (1963); House Comm. Amend. No. 1; H.B. 34,
71st Gen. Assem. (1961); and H.B. 341, 70th Gen. Assem. (1959).
8. U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV; Mo. CoNsT. 1945, art. 1, § 10.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1966
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Typical of the grace period technique are sections 516.060 and 516.065
RSMo extinguishing inchoate dower and dower consummate in the cases
therein specified. Another example is section 516.150 RSMo which extinguishes a mortgage lien twenty years after the mortgage is due on its
face unless a notice is filed for record. 9
The grace period technique to permit retroactive application would
seem to be unsuitable for settling interests where there is a perpetuities
violation; hence the Missouri act was drawn to be prospective only and
thereby avoid- the due process problem.
V. RUNNING OF THE PERPETUITIES PERIOD

Some earlier versions of a Missouri perpetuities bill achieved prospective operation by applying the act only to instruments becoming "effective"
after the effective date of the act, and then making an elaborate definition of the "effective date" of a deed, will, or other instrument.10 These
provisions are considered in detail in the last section of this article.
The draftsmen of the 1965 Missouri act chose a different method in
attempting to achieve the same end result. Section 442.555(3) provides
the act shall not apply to any limitation or provision as to which "the
period of the rule against perpetuities has begun to run" prior to November
1, 1965. The phrasing is a well-accepted method of putting the matter,
but it might cause some confusion to the uninitiated because the perpetuities period does not really run as does a statute of limitation (disregarding
those jurisdictions which have adopted "wait and see" by decision or
statute). What we are really talking about is the critical date as of which
the existing facts are ascertained and as of which the validity of the limitation under the Rule Against Perpetuities is determined by imaginatively
projecting a possible sequence of events that might cause a contingent
interest to vest more remotely than the permissible period. Once this
imaginative projection is made, no one (except an excluded beneficiary or
trustee deprived of fees) is concerned with what really comes to pass or
with how long the period actually runs. This critical date for testing
validity usually is the date of delivery of a deed or the date of a testator's
death, with exceptions as noted hereafter.
9. Eckhardt, Mortgages-Twenty-Year Limitation, 16 Mo. L. REV. 372, 38385 (1951); Strom, Mortgages-Twenty-year Limitation on Foreclosure, 19 Mo.
L. REv. 186 (1954); Mo. TiTLE EXAMINATION STANDARns, No. 23, ch. 442 App.
V.A.M.S. (1964 Supp.).

10. Bills cited in note 7 supra.

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol31/iss1/11
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A. Inter Vivos Transactions
Irrevocable deeds. In the case of a deed, ordinarily the perpetuities
period begins to run at the effective date of the deed, this being the date of
delivery. In most cases nothing of record indicates whether there has been
a delivery in fact, or the date of delivery; the fact of delivery, if any, is
proved by parol evidence, and in many cases delivery is presumed. In most
commercial transactions proof of delivery is easy and the exact date may
not be critical, but in a family "settlement" where a perpetuities problem
is apt to arise the exact time of delivery can be crucial because a significant
person may have been alive or dead at that time. For example, A dul conveys to swk. of B's, grandchildrenas reach 21. If B is alive at the time of
delivery the gift violates the Rule Against Perpetuities because B may have
afterborn children who are not lives in being, but if B is dead at the time
of delivery the gift is good because all of the children B ever can have are
alive or in gestation at B's death.
A deed may show as many as three dates, the date recited on the
face of the deed, the date of the acknowledgment, and the date of filing
for record. In the absence of proof as to the true date of delivery, there is a
presumption in Missouri that the deed was delivered on the date of the
acknowledgment."
Delivery to third person--in escrow. Frequently in family settlements
a deed absolute on its face is delivered to a third person for delivery to the
named grantee after the death of the grantor, thus in effect reserving a
life estate to the grantor. The basic problems of delivery into escrow have
been ably analyzed by Dean Emeritus Glenn A. McCleary.12 Courts have
applied two theories to make the transaction effective in the grantor's lifetime and validate such a delivery. One theory, preferred by many scholars,
is that the transaction is immediately effective on the first delivery, the
grantor's previous fee simple absolute forthwith being cut back to a defeasible fee, and the grantee forthwith receiving a springing executory
interest. Under such theory, the perpetuities period would start running
at the first delivery.
The other theory, preferred by perhaps most of the courts that have
considered the problem, is a relation back theory, that title does not really
11. Breshears v. Breshears, 360 Mo. 1057, 1064, 232 S.W.2d 460, 462 (1950);
Mo. TrrLE EXAMINATON STm-AmAES, No. 13, ch. 442 App. V.A.M.S. (1964 Supp.);
Mo. DIG., Dxmzs § 194(3).
12. McCleary, Some Problems Involved in Conditional Deliveries of Deeds,
32 U. Mo. BuLL. L. SER. 5, 21-26 (1931).
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1966
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pass until the second delivery, but by fiction relates back to the first delivery to validate the conveyance. Where the issue is one other than the
basic validity of the conveyance, relation back is applied or not applied
depending on what equitable result should be reached in the type of case.
Thus where a fire insurance policy is voided by any change in title other
than by reason of death of the insured, a court may hold in an escrow
case that title passed at the death of the insured grantor and there is not
a relation back to the first delivery which would have the effect of voiding
the insurance coverage. 13 Missouri cases appear to follow the relation back
theory, 14 but I have not made a critical analysis of the cases.
From the perpetuities point of view, if the court applies relation back
the perpetuities period starts running on the date of the first delivery, but
if relation back is rejected in this situation the perpetuities period would not
begin to run until the date of the second delivery, or more probably from
the date of the grantor's death by a limited relation back. I express no
opinion as to whether relation back should be applied where the issue is
one of perpetuities, but merely call attention to the possibilities.
Fully revocable living trust. A relatively new doctrine is that where

the settlor of a living trust reserves full powers of revocation or the unlimited power to draw on corpus, the perpetuities period begins to run at
the settlor's death rather than on the date the trust is created, unless the
power is released in the meantime. The leading case is Manufacturer Life
Ins. Co. v. Bon Hamm-Young Co.,15 which was concerned with a life insurance trust agreement. The problem is ably and exhaustively considered
13. Gridley v. Home Ins. Co., 226 App. Div. 596, 236 N.Y. 205 (1929).
14. See Mo. Dio., DEEDs § 58 (1).
15. 34 Hawaii 288 (1937).
Although not completely free from doubt, it is assumed for the purposes of
the present perpetuities discussion that a revocable trust is a valid inter vivos
transfer in Missouri and is not testamentary in nature: see Lowe, Transfers in
Fraud of Marital Riglts, 26 Mo. L. REv. 1, 14-15, nn. 60-65 (1961). This doctrine
is expressly recognized in Coon v. Stanley, 230 Mo. App. 524, 527(32, 94 S.W.2d
96, 98[52 (1936); this case is cited in Casner, Estate Planning-Avoidance of
Probate, 60 COL. L. REv. 108, 109, n. 7 (1960), for the contrary proposition, but
is distinguishable.
A related but independent problem is that a revocable inter vivos trust may
be a fraud on the marital rights of the surviving spouse and the surviving spouse
may be able to reach trust assets to satisfy marital rights, but this doctrine does
not depend on the trust being testamentary in nature. This problem in Missouri
is considered in detail by Professor Lowe in the article cited above. See also Casner,
op. cit. supra, at 125, n.68.
In Missouri in creating the inter vivos trust, the marital rights problem
can be avoided by joinder or other written express assent by the other spouse,
thus satisfying both the common law and the requirements of § 474.150 RSMo
1959.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol31/iss1/11
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in Ryan v. Ward.'6 There appear to be no Missouri cases, This doctrine is
a specialized application of a much broader doctrine; 17 another application
of the same broad doctrine will be considered infra under general powers of
appointment.
The above exception does not apply to living trusts which are only
partially revocable, and as to them the perpetuities period begins to run
at the creation of the trust.
Folly revocable deed. If an instrument in the form of a deed runs directly to a grantee and not through a trustee, and if the instrument is fully
revocable, it is not effective as a deed, but is effective only as a will if at
all. In such a case the perpetuities period would run from the "grantor's"
death.
Partially revocable deed. If an instrument in the form of a deed runs
directly to a grantee and not through a trustee and is only partially revocable, it may be effective as a deed, or it may be considered testamentary
in nature and effective only as a will if at all. In the former case the
perpetuities period would run from the date of delivery of the -deed, and
in the latter case from the death of the "grantor." The line beyond which
an instrument in the form of a deed ceases to be a deed and becomes a
will is obscure, but Missouri has some authority in this area.18
B. Wills
A will is revocable or subject to change until the death of the testator
and speaks from his death. The perpetuities period starts running from the
date of the testator's death. Ordinarily wills present no problem as to effective date.
On the other hand, contracts to make individual or reciprocal wills,
contracts to keep specific wills in force, and joint and mutual wills present
special problems not here explored. Speaking generally, in any of these
cases the perpetuities period may begin to run at a point of time earlier
than the death of the particular decedent.
16. 192 Md. 342, 64 A.2d 258 (1949). The case is also reported in 7 A.L.R.2d
1078 (1949), followed by a ten page annotation on the problem.
17. GRAY, RULE AGAINST PERPETuTEs § 203 (3d ed. 1915; 4th ed. by
Roland Gray 1942); § 524.1 (4th ed. 1942). See also RESTATEmENT OF PROPERTY
§ 373 (1944).
18. See Goins v. Melton, 343 Mo. 413, 121 S.W.2d 821 (1938), discussed in
Eckhardt, Work of Mo. Sup. Ct. 1938-Property,4 Mo. L. REV. 419, 419-21 (1940).
On the issue in question, Goins v. Melton was overruled by St. Louis County Nat.
Bank v. Fielder, 364 Mo. 207, 260 S.W.2d 483 (1953), discussed in Eckhardt,
Transactions Reserving Life Estate and Power over Fee, 18 Mo. L. REV. 374-76
(1953).
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1966
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Occasionally the exact time of death or the exact sequence of deaths
can be very important, not only in determining generally the devolution
of property and the incidence of death taxes, but also in determining
whether there has been a violation of the Rule Against Perpetuities. For
example, if A duly devises to such great-grandchildrenof A as reach, 21;
the Rule Against Perpetuities is violated if any of A's children are alive
or in gestation at A's death. If A and his only child C-1 are killed in an
automobile accident, the violation of the rule depends on whether C-1
predeceases or survives A and proof may be difficult or impossible. The
simultaneous death law does not solve this particular problem? 9
C. Powers of Appointment
The discussion above assumed a gift directly by an inter vivos or testamentary transaction and not through the medium of a power of appointment. The law on the application of the Rule Against Perpetuities to gifts
made by way of powers of appointment is complex, and the standard
treatises should be consulted, as well as specialized law review articles. A
brief search has not disclosed any Missouri case involving an application
of the Rule Against Perpetuities to a power of appointment.
Validity of the power-in general. Powers of appointment may be
void at their inception because they violate the Rule Against Perpetuities.
Very briefly, the general rules are as follows.
The initial validity of a general power to appoint by deed, or by deed
or will (i.e., a power which is the equivalent of ownership), is determined
by whether the power might vest in the donee more remotely than the
period of the rule. Thus, if a 1965 deed purports to create a general power
of appointment exercisable by deed, or by deed or will, in that person who
shall be President of the University of Missouri on January 1, 2000, the
power is void at its inception.
The initial validity of a special power of appointment, or of a general
testamentary power of appointment, is determined by whether it is so
limited that it might be exercised more remotely than the period of the rule.
Validity of the appointment-in general. Even though a power of appointment is valid at its inception (and most of them are), the appointment
made pursuant to the power may violate the Rule Against Perpetuities
and thus be void.
19. Sections 471.010-.080, RSMo. See VA.M.S. § 471.010 et seq. for citations
of discussions in the local law reviews of the simultaneous death problem and its
ramifications.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol31/iss1/11
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The usual analysis of the operation of a power of appointment is that
when the donee of a power makes the appointment, his act of appointing
is the event that causes title to shift or spring to the appointee. Additional
dogma is that the appointment is read back into the instrument creating
the power, and that the appointee derives his title from the donor of the
power, not from the donee of the power. Subject to the exception hereinafter noticed, in testing the validity of an appointment insofar as the Rule
Against Perpetuities is concerned, the critical date from which the perpetuities period runs is the effective date of the instrument creating the
power, and the validity of the appointed interest is determined by looking
forward from that date. However, the application of the "second look"
doctrine provides some amelioration, viz., we look not only at the facts at
the date of the creation, of the power, but also at the time of the appointment take a "second look" at the facts.
A hypothetical case will illustrate the basic doctrines. Suppose that
A devises to his child B for life, then as B shall appoint by will, and in default of appointment to B's lineal descendants per stirpes. Thereafter, B by
will appoints corpus with accumulated income to such of B's grandchildren
[A's great-grandchildren] as reach, 21, the class to remain open to include
all possible grandchildrenof B. Upon reading B's appointment back into A's
will, the limitation reads: A devises to his child B for life, then corpus with
accumulated income to such of B's grandchildren [A's great-grandchildren]
as reach 21, the class to remain open to include all possible grandchildren of
B. Having read the appointment back into the instrument creating the
power, and testing its validity by looking forward from the effective date
of the instrument creating the power, the appointment violates the Rule
Against Perpetuities because interests might vest too remotely in A's greatgrandchildren; there also might be a violation of the related rule limiting
accumulations.
However, the "second look" exception might save the above appointment, if on the effective date of B's appointment the facts are such that no
interest could vest too remotely, e.g., at his death B is a widower and all of
B's children have predeceased B, so that all possible grandchildren of B
[great-grandchildren of A] are alive or in gestation at B's death, and therefore all possible grandchildren of B will reach 21, if at all, within twentyone years after the death of B who is a life in being. (Of course the problem
and possible litigation should have been avoided at the time B made the
appointment; instead of appointing to B's "grandchildren," the appointment should have been to named grandchildren.)
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1966
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In applying the Rule Against Perpetuities to the exercise of powers,
there is one well-recognized exception, viz., a person who has a general
power presently exercisable (a power to appoint by deed, or by deed or
will), is considered to be the owner for perpetuities purposes; the period
of the rule begins to run at the date of the exercise of the power and the
validity of the appointment is determined by the circumstances existing at
that time. A leading American case is Mifflin's Appeal.20 The justification
for this exception is that the donee of the power has the equivalent of
ownership because he could appoint to himself and make himself absolute
owner; at any moment he can "loose the bonds."
There is some conflict, but the great weight of case authority is that
the "equivalent of ownership" exception does not apply in the case of a
general power exercisable only by will. It is clear that the exception does
not apply in the case of special powers.
Powers of appointment created and exercised before 1965 act. Where
an instrument creating a power of appointment and the instrument exercising the power both became effective prior to November 1, 1965, clearly
section 442.555 is not applicable either to validate the power of appointment or to save an appointment made under a valid power.
Powers of appointment created after 1965 act. Where the effective
date of an instrument creating a power of appointment is on or after November 1, 1965, clearly section 442.555 is applicable to validate insofar as
possible the power of appointment and to validate insofar as possible an
appointment made under the power.
Powers of appointment created before 1965 act, exercised after act. If
an instrument effective before November 1, 1965, purports to create a
power of appointment but the power itself violates the Rule Against Perpetuities, the 1965 Missouri act would not be applicable to validate the power
of appointment, and necessarily any attempted exercise of the power would
be ineffective. On the other hand, if the power was validly created before
November 1, 1965, but is exercised on or after November 1, 1965, section
442.555 ought to apply to save appointments, whether the power was general or special. The Maine and Vermont perpetuities acts expressly so provide.21 No doubt the Missouri act should have been specific on at least this
22
point, but the Missouri act was silent.
20. 121 Pa. 205, 15 Atl. 525 (1888).
21. ME. REv. STAT. ANN., tit. 33, § 106; VT. STAT. ANN., tit. 27, § 502.
22. In extenuation it should be stated that § 442.555(3) was drafted hurriedly to meet a deadline, with no time available for research and with little time
available for reflection.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol31/iss1/11
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Where the power is a general power presently exercisable, the donee
thereby having the equivalent of ownership, the perpetuities period begins
to run on the date the power is exercised, and section 442.555 is fully
applicable where such power is exercised on or after November 1, 1965.
Subject to this exception as to general powers presently exercisable,
the usual view is that where a power is exercised the perpetuities period
runs from the effective date of the instrument creating the power, by a
reading back of the appointment into the instrument creating the power.
This reading back, however, is really a fiction and is not necessarily followed
for all purposes.
At a time when Lockridge v. Mace was in effect in Missouri, it could
not have been successfully argued that an appointment which violated the
Rule Against Perpetuities would have the effect of invalidating the entire
limitation creating the power. At most, Lockridge v. Mace would have invalidated the entire appointment. Hence, at least for this purpose, there
would not have been a complete reading back in Missouri.
It would be in the spirit of section 442.555 to apply subsection 1
(abolishing the doctrine of Lockridge v. Mace) to any appointment made
on or after November 1, 1965, and to save the part of the appointment that
does not violate the Rule Against Perpetuities. It also would be in the
spirit of the act to apply subsection 2 and reform the appointment insofar
as possible to avoid violation of the rule. The application of the act to
all appointments made on or after November 1, 1965, is not constitutionally
objectionable. By applying the act to save the appointment, the appointees
are benefited, not harmed; and those who would take in default of appointment initially had interests which would be divested by a valid appointment, and applying the act to validate an attempted appointment leaves
those who would take in default of appointment in no worse position than
they were in originally.
It is my opinion that the saving provisions of section 442.555 should
be applied to any appointment made on or after November 1, 1965, even
though the power of appointment was created before November 1, 1965.
VI. CAVEAT ON SPECIFICS AS TO EFFECTIVE DATE

House Bill No. 341, 70th General Assembly, 1959, and House Bill No.
34, 71st General Assembly, 1961, both applied only to instruments effective
thereafter, and both included an elaborate section defining the effective
date of an instrument. Senate Bill No. 263, 72nd General Assembly, 1963,
did not include a transition provision in the original bill, but House CoinPublished by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1966

11

19661

Missouri Law Review, Vol. 31, Iss. 1 [1966], Art. 11

PERPETUITIES REFORM

mittee Amendment No. 1 added the same effective date provision that
appeared in the earlier bills, as follows:
Section 3. For the purposes of this act the effective date of
a deed, will or other instrument means:
(1) In the case of an irrevocable conveyance or transfer
inter vivos, the date of the conveyance or transfer;
(2) In the case of a will, the date of the death of the testator;
(3) In the case of a revocable conveyance or transfer inter
vivos, the date of the death of the conveyor or transferor, unless
the power to revoke such conveyance or transfer shall have expired
or been relinquished during the lifetime of the conveyor or transferor, in which event the effective date shall be the date of such
expiration or relinquishment; and
(4) In the case of an instrument which exercises a power to
appoint conferred by a prior deed, will or other instrument, the
date of such exercise, provided, that, if the power is restricted by
the prior deed, will or other instrument, either as to the time of its
exercise or as to the type of instrument by which it may be exercised, or as to the persons and corporations who may be appointees thereunder, the instrument of appointment shall be
treated as having the same effective date as the deed, will or other
instrument conferring the power.
These provisions were drawn by a highly skilled lawyer, and probably
are as well drawn as could be done in a few words, but nevertheless would
require considerable litigation to determine what they really mean. The
reason the Missouri Bar draft in 1965 sought refuge in generalities instead
of reintroducing the specific provisions above was simply that the specifics
were too incomplete and too inaccurate and would require extended
judicial construction to fill in the gaps and to cure insofar as possible the
inaccuracies.
For example, subsection 1 refers to "the date of the conveyance or
transfer." As indicated above, three dates are usually involved, but the
proposed act does not indicate which one of the three is intended unless
it points to the date on the face of the instrument. No attempt is made
to cover the problem of deeds in escrow.
Subsection 1 deals with "irrevocable" transfers, and subsection 3 deals
with "revocable" transfers, but between the extremes of completely irrevocable deeds and fully revocable deeds there are all degrees of partial
revocability. The gray areas are not noticed at all. In addition, Missouri
has no authority on the problem of revocability with reference to the applihttps://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol31/iss1/11
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cation of the Rule Against Perpetuities, and no one can be sure what view
Missouri courts might be inclined to follow.
Subsection 2 on wills would seem to be accurate and not apt to raise
any new problems in the case of an ordinary will.
Subsection 4 on powers of appointment is an attempt in ninety-seven
words to state the rules on a very complex problem, and to state them for a
jurisdiction which has no case authority. The result leaves much to be desired. For example, it is provided there can be no restriction by the instrument creating the power "as to the type of instrument by which it may
be exercised." If this wording were followed literally, the equivalent of
ownership doctrine would not apply to a general power exercisable by
"deed" only, nor to a general power exercisable only by "deed or will," but
would apply only to a general power exercisable by "deed, will or other
instrument." This is not helpful, and could be very harmful.
Those who worked on the 1965 Missouri Bar draft tried their hands at
revising the effective date provisions of the earlier bills, but ended with a
feeling of complete frustration; thereupon they abandoned the attempt to
accomplish the impossible and resorted to a generality which could be
accurately stated, which the courts could fill in, and which would not hamper the courts. As indicated at note 22 supra, they too fell short of perfection.
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